Following
months of protest, Congress has finally put forth bicameral Fast Track
legislation today to rush trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) through
Congress. Sens. Orrin Hatch and Ron Wyden, and Rep. Paul Ryan, respectively,
introduced the bill titled the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and
Accountability Act of 2015. With Fast Track, lawmakers will be shirking their
constitutional authority over trade policy, letting the White House and the
U.S. Trade Representative pass Internet rules in back room meetings with
corporate industry groups. If this passes, lawmakers would only have a small
window of time to conduct hearings over trade provisions and give a yea-or-nay
vote on ratification of the agreement without any ability to amend it before
they bind the United States to its terms.
The Fast
Track bill contains some minor procedural improvements from the version of the
bill introduced last year. However, these fixes will do little to nothing to
address the threats of restrictive digital regulations on users rights in the
TPP or TTIP. The biggest of these changes is language that would create a new
position of Chief Transparency Officer that would supposedly have the authority
to “consult with Congress on transparency policy, coordinate transparency in
trade negotiations, engage and assist the public, and advise the United States
Trade Representative on transparency policy.”
However,
given the strict rules of confidentiality of existing, almost completed trade
deals and those outlined in the Fast Track bill itself, we have no reason to
believe that this officer would have much power to do anything meaningful to
improve trade transparency, such as releasing the text of the agreement to the
public prior to the completion of negotiations. As it stands, the text only has
to be released to the public 60 days before it is signed, at which time the
text is already locked down from any further amendments.
The bill’s only new feature in this respect
is a new “consultation and compliance” procedure that would only be usable
after an agreement was already signed and entered into, at which point changes
to the pact could be made only if all other negotiating parties agreed to
reopen negotiations and then agreed to the changes (likely after extracting
further concessions from the United States). That process would require
approval by 60 Senators to take a pact off of Fast Track consideration, even
though a simple majority “no” vote in the Senate would have the same effect on
an agreement.
Thus,
essentially the Fast Track bill does the same as it ever did—tying the hands of
Congress so that it is unable to give meaningful input into the agreement
during its drafting, or to thoroughly review the agreement once it is
completed.
A main
feature of the bill is its negotiation objectives, which set the parameters
within which the President is authorized to negotiate the agreement. If
Congress considers that the text ultimately deviates from these objectives, it
can vote the agreement down. Some of these negotiation objectives have been
added or changed since the previous Fast Track bill, but none of these provide
any comfort to us on the troubling issues from the Intellectual Property,
E-Commerce, and Investment chapters of the TPP. Indeed, some of the new text
raise concerns. For example:
Governments are to “refrain from
implementing trade-related measures that impede digital trade in goods and
services, restrict cross-border data flows, or require local storage or
processing of data”. Data flows and the location of the processing of data
aren't solely or even primarily trade issues; they are human rights issues that
can affect privacy, free expression and more. The discussion about whether laws
that require local storage and processing of certain kinds of sensitive
personal data are protective of user rights, for instance, cannot take place in
the secret enclaves of a trade negotiation. The bill does allow for exceptions
as required to further "legitimate policy objectives", but only where
these "are the least restrictive on trade" and "promote an open
market environment".
Trade secrets collected by governments are
to be protected against disclosure except in "exceptional circumstances to
protect the public, or where such information is effectively protected against
unfair competition". But there are other cases in which there may be an
important public interest in the disclosure of such trade secrets, such as
where they reveal past misdeeds, or throw transparency onto the activities of
corporations executing public functions.
But more
troubling than what has been included in the negotiating objectives, is what
has been excluded. There is literally nothing to require balance in copyright,
such as the fair use right. On the contrary; if a country's adoption of a fair
use style right causes loss to a foreign investor, it could even be challenged
as a breach of the agreement, under the investor-state dispute settlement
(ISDS) provisions. Further, the "Intellectual Property" section of
today's bill is virtually identical to the version introduced in 2002, and what
minor changes there are do not change the previous text's evident antipathy for
fair use. So while the new bill has added, as an objective, "to ensure
that trade agreements foster innovation and promote access to medicines,"
an unchanged objective is "providing strong enforcement of intellectual
property rights." What happens if those two objectives are in conflict?
For example, in many industries, thin copyright and patent restrictions have
proven to be more conducive to innovation than the thick, "strong"
measures the bill requires. Some of our most innovative industries have been
built on fair use and other exceptions to copyright—and that's even more
obvious now than it was in 2002. The unchanged language suggests the underlying
assumption of the drafters is that more IP restrictions mean more innovation
and access, and that's an assumption that's plainly false.
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